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Taking a balanced panel data consisting of 4365 firm-year observations 
drawn from the listed state-owned enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange over 2007-2015 as the research sample, the paper ex-
amines the effect of the employees’ pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) 
on the future firm performance from the two competing perspectives of 
“incentive effect” and “risk-aversion effect”, adopting the method of mul-
tiple regression analysis based on OLS and applying the SPSS23 as the 
data processing tool. Theoretical analysis and empirical results demon-
strate that there is a positive link between the employees’ PPS and the 
future firm performance. To improve the employees’ PPS can stimulate 
the engagement of the employees, improve their working quality, enrich 
their workplace innovative behavior, and further lead to higher future firm 
performance. Meanwhile, the positive effect of the employees’ PPS on 
the future firm performance is, on average, lower than that of the top ex-
ecutives’ PPS on the future firm performance. Implications of the findings 
are provided in the end.
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1. Introduction
The growing interest conflicts between the top man-agers, as the agents, and the shareholders, as the principals, deriving from the never-ending separa-
tion of operating right and ownership are capturing even 
more attention from both the scholars and practitioners, 
especially in China. Due to the incompleteness of hiring 
contract, the information asymmetry and the goal incon-
sistencies between the two parties, the agents’ deviation 
and even departure from the principals’ interests were 
most likely to emerge. In order to avoid this problem, the 
principal-agent theory proposes an effective application of 
compensation contract for the top managers. Such a con-
tract should align the interests of the top managers with 
those of the shareholders by linking their compensation 
with firm performance. As a consequence, the pay-per-
formance sensitivity (PPS) of top managers is always 
considered as the core issue of executive compensation 
arrangements in existing literature[1, 2, 3]. 
PPS of top managers is usually defined as the positive 
link between executive compensation and firm perfor-
mance, which is calculated by the top managers’ compen-
sation change units derived from each unit change of firm 
performance[4]. In existing literature, PPS of top managers 
is a measure of interest alignment between owners and 
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managers[5, 6]. Therefore, the effect of top managers’ PPS 
on future firm performance has been explored to a large 
extent since 1990s, both in the western countries and Chi-
na [7, 8]. On the whole, the existing literature on this topic 
has concluded two competing views, i.e., “incentive ef-
fect” and “risk-aversion effect” [9, 10, 11]. 
The former view holds that the interest conflicts be-
tween the principals and the agents can be mitigated or 
weakened by paying the executives strictly according to 
firm performance, and a higher PPS can produce higher 
incentive effect of the top managers. As a quintessential 
example, holding the view of “incentive effect”, Tianna 
Yang and Wenxuan Hou[8] used a sample of US closed-
end funds from 2006 to 2009, and investigated the firm 
consequences of PPS of fund managers, which was speci-
fied in their contracts as the marginal rate of the funds' net 
asset value. It was found that fund PPS positively deter-
mined the managers’ risk-taking behaviors, which would 
lead to higher future performance at a higher possibility, 
especially in the emerging markets. In contrast, the later 
opposite view argues that when the top executives’ pay is 
too closely linked with firm performance, due to the na-
ture of risk aversion, they will reduce the operating risk of 
the whole firm in order to avoid the extra-risk they them-
selves would bear. In this case, firm performance would 
be harmed by the executives’ too much lower risk-taking 
behavior. As another quintessential example, holding the 
view of “risk-aversion effect”, Ivan E. Brick et al. [4] ex-
amined the relation between PPS and future stock returns 
for a large sample of firms between 1992 and 2004, and 
concluded that higher PPS was associated with lower fu-
ture stock returns.
The results of literature review demonstrate that, in 
most of the existing studies, except for exceedingly lim-
ited research work, the top managers’ PPS produces the 
higher incentive effect than the risk-aversion effect. In 
other words, to set a higher PPS is beneficial to motivate 
the top managers to work hard with the purpose of maxi-
mizing the interests of the shareholders. A large quantity 
of existing literature has explored the effect of the top 
mangers’ PPS on future firm performance to a large ex-
tent, which is of great significance for setting the optimal 
compensation contract of the top managers. When we 
draw our attentions from the top managers to the front-
line employees, it can be found that, as the actual creators 
of the firm performance, the employees have greater 
power than the top executives in determining firm’s out-
put, especially in the capital-or-labor intensive industries. 
However, till today, the effect of the employees’ PPS on 
future firm performance has not been explored yet. 
This study empirically examines the incentive effect 
and risk-aversion effect of the employees’ PPS by testing 
the relation between the employees’ PPS and the future 
firm performance, measured by earnings per share and 
return on assets. We attempt to answer two research ques-
tions: first, is higher PPS of the employees associated with 
greater financial performance, and second, whether or not 
the positive effect of the employees’ PPS on the future 
firm performance is lower than that of the top executives’ 
PPS on the future firm performance? The study focuses 
on Chinese state-owned enterprises because the existing 
literature has not fully considered the PPS’s effect in the 
context of the state-owned enterprises in China, while 
such enterprises are different from the others in nature and 
are basically essential to the economic growth of China. 
Based on the data consisting of 4365 firm-year observa-
tions drawn from the listed state-owned enterprises in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange over 2007-2015, 
we find that there is a positive link between the employ-
ees’ PPS and the future firm performance, which indicates 
that to improve the employees’ PPS can stimulate the en-
gagement of the employees, improve their working quali-
ty, enrich their workplace innovative behavior, and further 
lead to higher future firm performance. Furthermore, the 
positive effect of the employees’ PPS on the future firm 
performance is, on average, lower than that of the top ex-
ecutives’ PPS on the future firm performance. 
The contribution of this paper to the compensation 
literature is threefold. First, we are among the first to ex-
amine empirically the performance consequences of the 
employees' PPS. Despite the popularity of PPS of the top 
managers in existing literature, the extent to which the 
incentive role of the employees' PPS is effective remains 
unexplored. Second, we are the first to compare the in-
centive effect on firm performance between the employ-
ees' PPS and the top managers' PPS. Third, we add new 
knowledge in understanding the trade-off mechanisms be-
tween the incentive effect and risk-aversion effect of the 
employees' PPS in the context of listed state-owned enter-
prises in China, the second largest economy in the world.
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis
Incentive effect and risk-aversion effect of the top manag-
ers’ PPS are two closely linked core concepts in the opti-
mal contract theory, which pays attention to the design the 
top managers’ compensation contracts effectively and the 
discussion on the contracts’ effectiveness. The two effects 
run at the same time in practice, and when incentive effect 
exceed the risk-aversion effect, higher PPS would leader 
to higher firm performance; while when the risk-aversion 
effect dominates the incentive effect, higher PPS is cor-
related with poorer future firm performance.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jbar.v2i3.924
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In the opinion of the incentive effect, a higher PPS can 
assure the interest alignment between the shareholders, as 
the principal, and the top managers, as the agents, which 
allows the top managers enjoy the residuals claim rights 
just as the shareholders do[12]. Facing a higher PPS, the top 
managers will find it is their best choice to work hard for 
the maximization of firm value. As such, the top managers 
would like to adopt more projects with higher risk exert-
ing their best efforts, instead of avoiding beneficial risks. 
Such an effect of PPS is called as the “incentive effect” 
[13, 14]. While according to the view of the risk-aversion 
perspective, too high PPS would make the top managers 
face too high risks, both in their income and job safety. In 
this case, the top managers bear too much risk transferred 
from the shareholders, and they would like to avoid risky 
projects and withdraw their innovative efforts, with the 
purpose of making themselves endure fewer risk expo-
sures. As such, with the increase of the PPS, risk-aversion 
effect would exceed the incentive effect [4].
From the perspective of incentive effect, the existing 
literature has argued that the improvement of the top man-
agers’ PPS would enhance the interests of consistency 
of the shareholders and top managers. Such a fact would 
induce the later to take on more risky projects and invest 
more energy in running their firms, and thus the firm val-
ue can be improved. Prior studies have provided empirical 
support to the incentive effect perspective.
Firstly, Abowd [13] explored the link between the top 
mangers’ PPS and future firm performance by selecting 
the data of 250 American large companies over 1981-1986 
as the sample adopted the two-step method. The survey 
results manifest that top managers’ compensation is posi-
tively related to firm performance and a higher PPS of the 
top managers would certainly lead to a much higher future 
firm performance.
Secondly, Mehran[14] concluded that the top mangers’ 
PPS is positively linked with firm performance based on 
the data of 153 randomly selected manufacturing enter-
prises over 1979-1980. Besides, he further demonstrated 
that it is the structure of the compensation rather than 
the level that can motivate the top managers to involve 
themselves in the firm running effort. The findings of this 
research provided strong evidence for the advocates that 
support the applications of performance-based incentive 
compensation.
Thirdly, McConaughy and Mishra [12] confirmed that, 
for American companies, higher PPS of the top managers 
would improve future firm performance to a certain de-
gree by making a regression analysis of the top managers’ 
PPS on the risk-adjusted ROE. However, such an im-
provement of the top managers’ PPS is not significant for 
the firms originally performing well, while it is greater in 
the firms with underdeveloped performance in their recent 
history.
Fourthly, Mishra, McConaughy and Gobeli[15] made a 
though study on this topic by employing the listed Ameri-
can enterprises over 1974-1988, which came to a positive 
relationship between the top managers’ PPS and future 
firm performance. What is more, with the increase of the 
top managers’ PPS, such a positive link would get weaker 
and weaker. At the same time, they also found that there 
is a much stronger positive relationship between the top 
managers’ PPS and future firm performance in the low-
er-risk firms than that in the higher-risk firms. 
Finally, in China, employing the data of the top man-
agers’ compensation of the Chinese listed companies over 
2002-2004 as the sample, Zhou Jianan and Huang Deng-
shi[16] concluded that the top executives’ PPS has a posi-
tive relationship with the firms’ future performance and 
risk-bearing behavior in the firms with higher growth op-
portunities, while there is a negative relationship between 
the two in the firms with poorer growth opportunities. 
Such a fact means that growth opportunities can moderate 
the effect of the top managers’ PPS on future firm perfor-
mance.
From the perspective of risk-aversion effect, a too high 
PPS would lead to the top managers to lower the overall 
operating risk of their firms with the purpose of minimiz-
ing their own risk in position safety and compensation 
level, while such a lower risk-bearing intention would 
reduce the overall value of the responding firms. On the 
whole, prior studies have provided rather limited empiri-
cal support to the risk-aversion perspective.
To be specific, Oded Palmon et al. [4] explored the re-
lationship between the top executives’ PPS and future 
firm performance by adopting the data of American large 
companies over 1992-2004. And contrary to the previous 
studies, they concluded a negative link between the two. 
According to their opinion, the reason for such a negative 
link may rely on the risk-aversion effect of the top man-
agers’ PPS. In other words, with the increase of the PPS, 
the risk-aversion intention of the top managers would be 
inspired, which would induce the top managers to reduce 
the whole risk-exposing level of their firms in order to 
assure their baseline compensation level, and thus the ac-
companied results would be the lower firm performance. 
In a similar vein, after considering the effect of the en-
dogenous variables on the top executives’ compensation, 
Palia [17] found insignificant positive relationship between 
PPS and future firm performance. Instead, he argued an 
insignificant negative link between the two concepts due 
to the simultaneous working of a positive incentive effect 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jbar.v2i3.924
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and a relatively stronger negative risk-aversion effect.
An ocean of existing literature has confirmed the pos-
itive effect of a higher PPS of the top managers on the 
future firm performance derived from the incentive effect, 
while only exceedingly limited scholars are still support-
ing the negative relationship between the two deriving 
from the risk-aversion effect. However, when it comes to 
the effect of the employees’ PPS on future firm perfor-
mance, how the two competing effects would play their 
roles? Since it is still a black-box for such a mechanism, 
the next part would try to reveal the link between the em-
ployees’ PPS and future firm performance under the back-
ground of Chinese state-owned companies.
Firstly, before 2000s, the Chinese state-owned en-
terprises adopted a compensation system called as “the 
mess”, which led to the absolute equalitarianism phenom-
enon whereby everyone gets the usual and fixed pay ir-
respective of his or her work performance. Though after 
2000s, most of the state-owned enterprises in China took 
the reform in compensation system and performance 
management system which enhanced the gap between 
different employees with various performance, and there-
after provided a stronger link between firm performance 
and employees’ pay, such changes didn’t reach the expec-
tations of the employees of the state-owned enterprises, 
especially the core staff who can account for more than 
80% of the  variation in firm performance determined by 
rank and file staff. Under this background, an increase 
in the employees’ PPS would be appreciated by the core 
staff, since they have much higher confidence and capa-
bility in determining their own performance and the firm 
performance effectively. The remaining 80% rank and 
file staff may have vague or uncertain attitude towards a 
higher PPS, however, the positive attitude of the core staff 
towards it would have the essential improvement effects 
on firm performance.
Secondly, the so-called “Consumption Upgrading” in 
China has never stopped in the past two decades. Such a 
fact leads to a rapid increase in household consumption 
expenditure of employees, especially the employees who 
have one or two sons. For most of the employees, as the 
average folks, their income mainly depends on the com-
pensation or wages paid by their firms. A higher PPS of 
the employees provides them with a pleasurable oppor-
tunity receiving higher compensation which can satisfy 
their ever-growing needs for consumption expenditure. 
Therefore, most of the employees would like to accept a 
higher PPS rather than a lower PPS, especially the core 
staff, who have stronger confidence in achieving higher 
individual performance and thus leading to higher firm 
performance at a high possibility.
Thirdly, a high PPS not only means the pay-firm per-
formance sensitivity would be higher, but means the 
pay-individual performance sensitivity would be higher. 
The later would lead to a higher pay gap between high-
ly-performing employees and poorly-performing employ-
ees. A fact is that the post-90s workers are increasingly 
taking the dominant part of the front-line employees, 
and thus firm performance is determined by the younger 
post-90s workers to a larger degree. Such a group man-
ifests higher favor over competition among employees, 
emphasize the balance between giving and receiving to a 
higher degree, and enjoy a higher sense of self-achieve-
ment and a sense of distinction derived from their higher 
compensation compared with their peers. Here, a higher 
PPS of the employees would improve the possibility of 
satisfying such needs or favors of the post-90s workers’, 
since a higher individual performance would enlarge the 
pay gap between them and others, and would further pro-
vide them with getting ever increasing compensation lev-
els under such a higher PPS, only if they could improve 
their performance and their firm’s performance to a large 
extent. By the way, the post-90s employees usually own 
a much stronger sense of self-efficacy than their seniors. 
Therefore, facing a higher PPS, they don’t fare challenges 
and would like to embrace competitions, instead, a higher 
effort degree and engagement in work would be motivat-
ed by such a high PPS. What is more, incentive strength 
of such a higher PPS can even stimulate the innovative 
capability of the post-90s employees. And thus, firm per-
formance would get better.
The last but not the least, there is a strong wage rigidity 
for employees in Chinese state-owned enterprises, since 
such enterprises not only bear the economic responsibil-
ity, but bear more social and political responsibility. In 
this case, there would be an implicit psychological con-
tract between the top managers and the employees, which 
demonstrates that the employees’ pay can be improved 
according to higher firm performance, while it cannot 
be reduced proportionately according to poorer firm per-
formance. Otherwise, a huge number of employees of 
the state-owned enterprises who have been reduced their 
wages significantly would express their anger toward the 
top managers and even the local government. And the top 
managers would face the risk of losing their jobs or even 
other heavier punishments due to the social harmony is-
sues. Hence, when a higher PPS is set for the employees, 
both the top managers and the employees know that when 
the state-owned enterprises’ performance is higher, the 
employees’ compensation would be increased essentially; 
while when the performance gets poorer, the employees’ 
compensation would not be reduced to a large degree. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jbar.v2i3.924
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That is to say, a higher PPS in fact would reflect as an 
asymmetric change of the employees’ compensation, 
which is beneficial to the employees. On the whole, un-
der the background of wage rigidity of the state-owned 
enterprises, higher PPS of the employees would improve 
their work engagement and thus lead to higher firm per-
formance.
Based on the discussion above, the following hypothe-
sis can be put forward.
H1: The employees’ PPS of the state-owned enter-
prises is positively associated with the future firm perfor-
mance.
Since it is widely shared that the employees, on av-
erage, have higher risk-aversion intentions than the top 
managers do, then the risk-aversion effect of the em-
ployees’ PPS is much higher than that of the top man-
agers’ PPS. At the same time, the incentive effect of the 
employees’ PPS is relatively weaker than those of the 
top managers’ PPS, since the links between individual 
employees’ performance and firm performance is lower 
than the links between the top managers’ performance 
and firm performance. Accordingly, it can be concluded 
as the follows.
H2: The positive effect of the employees’ PPS on the 
future firm performance is lower than that of the top ex-
ecutives’ PPS on the future firm performance.
3. Methodology
3.1 Sample and Data
Taking all the A-share listed state-owned enterprises in 
Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange over 2007-2015 
as the sample framework, the following steps are executed 
to select the final research sample: (1) Listed companies 
ever marked with ST, PT, SST, *ST should be removed 
from the sample; (2) Listed companies belonging to Fi-
nance and Insurance Industry should be removed from the 
sample; (3) Listed companies without disclosing all the 
data needed in this research should be eliminated from the 
sample; (4) Listed companies with extreme values (i.e., 
outliers) should be removed from the sample. For exam-
ple, if the employees’ compensation is higher than the av-
erage compensation of the top managers, then such firms 
should be removed; (5) Listed companies should have 
been listed before 2006. 
All the data are downloaded from the financial database 
of CSMAR. Based on the mentioned selection require-
ments, a balanced panel sample consisting of 4365 firm-
year observations over 9 years is chosen. Spss23 is the 
main data processing software.
3.2 Measures
Independent variable: Employees’ PPS (EPPS). Refer-
ring to the idea of Babenko [18] and considering the data 
availability in China, the following steps finally get the 
result of EPPS. (1) Step 1: The number of front-line 
employees (ENUM) is determined by the difference be-
tween the whole number of employees disclosed in the 
annual report (WNUM) and the number of top managers, 
i.e., ENUM=WNUM-TNUM. (2) Step 2: The total re-
muneration of employees in the current period (TREC) 
is simultaneously determined by the cash paid to and 
for employees (CPTE), salary payable at the end of the 
term (SPET) and salary payable at the beginning of the 
term (SPBT), i.e., TREC=CPTE+SPET-SPBT. (3) Step 
3: The average compensation of the front-line employees 
(ACFE) is determined by both ENUM and TREC, i.e., 
ACFE=TREC/ACFE. (4) Step 4: EPPS is co-determined 
by the ACFE in the year of t (ACFEt), ACFE in the year 
of t-1 (ACFEt-1), the earnings per share in the year of t 
(EPSt) and the earnings per share in the year of t-1(EPSt-1), 
i.e., EPPS=(ACFEt-ACFEt-1)/(EPSt-EPSt-1).
However, when we calculate the distribution charac-
teristics of EPPS, the kurtosis, skewness and variance all 
manifest that EEPS follows an excessive skewed distri-
bution which is far away from the normal distribution. 
Besides, the P-P Diagram Test confirms such a result, too. 
Therefore, according to Zhang Changzheng & Mu Xin [19], 
further transformation of EEPS is needed to ensure the 
validity of the regression results.
Since the dimensions of (ACFEt-ACFEt-1) and (EPSt-
EPSt-1) are extremely different, we try to translate them 
into a unified dimensionless. To be specific, when 
(ACFEt-ACFEt-1) is positive, after sorting the sub-sample 
by it, (ACFEt-ACFEt-1) of the firms located over top 20%, 
top 40% to 20%, top 60% to 80% and below top 80% 
is respectively marked as 5, 4, 3, 2 and 1; While when 
(ACFEt-ACFEt-1) is negative, after sorting the sub-sample 
by it, (ACFEt-ACFEt-1)
T of the firms located above top 
20%, top 40% to 20%, top 60% to 80% and below top 
80% is respectively marked as -1, -2, -3, -4 and -5. In the 
same logic, (EPSt-EPSt-1)
 T can be categorized into -1, -2, 
-3, -4, -5, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. The final transformed EPPS 
(EPPST) can be known based on the ratio of (ACFEt-
ACFEt-1) 
T to (EPSt-EPSt-1) 
T. 
Dependent variable: Future firm performance. Follow-
ing Nyberg et al. [20], return on equity in the year of t+1 
(ROEt+1) is adopted as the measure of future firm perfor-
mance.
Control variables: Referring to the existing literature on 
the antecedents of firm future performance [4, 15, 21, 22, 23, 24], 
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considering the data availability, the following factors are 
selected as the control variables. (1) SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets; (2) DEBT is the asset-liability 
ratio; (3) BOARD is the number of the directors; (4) RID 
is the ratio of the independent directors to BOARD; (5) 
DUAL is 1 when CEO and Chairman are taken by the 
same character, otherwise DUAL is 0; (6) AGE is the 
real CEO age measured by years; (7) TENU is the tenure 
of the CEO measured by months; (8) RFE is the ratio of 
female executives to the number of the top managers; (9) 
RFS is the ratio of the first shareholder’s share to total 
shares; (10) BDS is the ratio of the sum of the second 
to the ninth largest shareholders’ share to the first share-
holder’s share; (11) RMS is the ratio of the top managers’ 
shareholdings to the total number; (12) EAST is set as 1 
when the firm is registered in the eastern regions in China, 
otherwise, EAST is set as 0.
3.3 Analytical Technique
In this study, we construct a regression model based on 
OLS shown in Model 1, which contains an explanatory 
variable (EPPST), a dependent variable (ROEt+1) and thir-
teen control variables. 
, 1 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,
7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , ,RFE TENU
T
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
ROE EPPS SIZE DEBT BOARD RID DUAL
AGE RFS BDS RMS EAST
α β β β β β β
β β β β β β β ε
+ = + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + +
 (1)
In Model 1, if β1is significantly positive, then we can 
draw a conclusion that the employees’ PPS (EPPST) does 
positively determine future firm performance (ROEt+1).In 
other words, H1 can be tested to a large extent.
Referring to the definition of Lee[25] and Nyberg et al. [20], 
the top managers’ PPS is calculated as the ratio of Δ (log-
arithm of the top mangers’ total compensation) to ΔEPS. 
If the result is positive, the top managers PPS (TMPPS) is 
set as 1, otherwise, TMPPS is set as 0. To replace EPPST 
with TMPPS, and replace ROEt+1 with EPSt+1 in Model 1, 
Model 2 is constructed. 
, 1 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,
7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , ,RFE TENU
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
EPS TMPPS SIZE DEBT BOARD RID DUAL
AGE RFS BDS RMS EAST
α β β β β β β
β β β β β β β ε
+ = + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + +
 (2)
In Model 2, if β1is significantly positive, then we can 
draw a conclusion that the top managers’ PPS (TMPPS) 
does positively determine future firm performance 
(EPSt+1). If β1 is Model 2 is obviously higher than that in 
Model 1, then H2 holds.
4. Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis
Table 1 manifests that the mean value of employ-
ees’ PPS (EPPST) is 0.138, which demonstrates that the 
employees’ compensation is actually positively related 
to firm performance of the former period, however, the 
sensitivity is rather weak in its strength. For example, if 
we adopt the same measurement method to calculate the 
top managers’ PPS, then the mean value would be 0.263, 
which is nearly twice as much that of employees’ PPS. It 
can be seen that on the whole the PPS of the top managers 
is relatively higher than that of the employees in the state-
owned enterprises of China, and the top managers bear 
higher risk of their rewards. The mean value of ROEt+1 is 
7.1%, which is higher than that of the non-state-owned 
enterprises. Hence, the state-owned enterprises econom-
ically perform better than the other enterprises in China. 
Besides, the mean value of the ratio of female executives 
is 12.7%, the mean value of CEO age is about 50 years, 
the mean value of CEO tenure is about 33.31 months, the 
mean value of the ratio of independent directors is 36.6%, 
and about 9.1% firms choose the same character as the 
CEO and Chairman.
According to Table 1, there is a significant positive re-
lationship between ROEt+1 and EPPS
T (Coefficient=0.035, 
P<0.05), which preliminarily confirms this hypothesis. 
And most of the control variables are significantly cor-
related with ROEt+1, which means that the selection of the 
control variables is of excellent rationality. What is more, 
all the coefficients among the research variables are be-
low than 0.5, which means that the multiple collinearity 
problems in this study are acceptable. Besides, the link 
between firm size and ROEt+1 is the strongest, while there 
is no significant relationship between CEO tenure and 
ROEt+1, which needs further exportation in depth.
4.2 Test on H1
In order to test H1, Model 1 is executed by applying the 
sample mentioned above, and the regression results are 
shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 manifests F value of Model 1 is 21.531 and its 
significance level is 0.000, which mean that the regression 
validity, i.e., the goodness of fit of Model 1, is acceptable, 
and this model can explain the variance of future firm 
performance (ROEt+1) to a large extent. Results manifest 
that EPPST is positively related to ROEt+1 (Beta = 0.030, 
T = 2.059), which means that the employees’ PPS would 
improve the future firm performance. In other words, the 
incentive effect of PPS dominates over its risk-aversion 
effect of employees in the state-owned enterprises in Chi-
na. H1 holds.
Besides, among the control variables, SIZE, RFE, RFS, 
BDS and RMS are all positively related to ROEt+1, which 
means that firm size, the ratio of female executives, equity 
concentration degree, equity balance degree and share-
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holdings of top executives can improve future firm per-
formance. On the whole, the above results are consistent 
with the existing literature; DEBT and RID are both nega-
tively related to ROEt+1, which means that the asset-liabil-
ity ratio and the ratio of independent directors both have 
negative effects on future firm performance. The results 
manifest that the utilization efficiency of debt funds of the 
state-owned enterprises is rather financially-challenged, 
and the independent directors have not performed their re-
sponsibilities effectively; BOARD, DUAL and EAST all 
have no significant relationship with ROEt+1, which means 
that the board size, CEO duality and being located in the 
eastern China have nothing to do with future firm perfor-
mance.
4.3 Robustness test on H1
a. Robustness test on H1 based the measurement 
of the employees’ PPS
Referring to the view of Lee[25] and Nyberg et al.[20], the 
employees’ PPS is calculated as the ratio of the change of 
TREC’s logarithm to the change of EPS. If the result is 
positive, the employees’ PPS (EPPS01) is set as 1, other-
wise, EPPS01 is set as 0. 
To replace EPPST with EPPS01 in Model 1, Model 
1* is constructed. Regression results of Model 1* are 
shown in Table 3, which indicates that the coefficient of 
EPPS01 on ROEt+1 is still significantly positive (β=0.075, 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations
Variables Means SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 ROEt+1 .07 .08
2 EPPST .14 1.73 .04*
3 SIZE 22.27 1.18 .13** .01
4 DEBT .53 .19 -.02 -.02 .38**
5 BAORD 9.36 1.84 .02 .00 .27** .11**
6 RID .37 .05 -.04* .01 .08** .03* -.25**
7 DUAL .09 0.29 .00 -.01 -.07** -.00 -.05** .05**
8 RFE .13 .15 .03* .01 -.13** -.07** -.10** .02 .01
9 AGE 49.00 5.74 .05** .01 .13** -.03 .04* -.03 .09** -.03*
10 TENU 33.31 32.58 -.02 .01 .12** -.02 .00 .02 .10** .03 .28**
11 RFS .38 .14 .10** .00 .24** -.01 -.01 .04* -.08** -.10** .03 -.05**
12 BDS .52 0.48 .06** .01 -.04** .00 .11** -.06** .01 .07** .00 .04** -.67**
13 RMS .00 .01 .09** .00 -.05** -.11** -.07** -.05** .15** .06** .01 .04** -.08** .13**
14 EAST .61 .49 .06** .01 .07** -.09** -.10** -.09** .03* .08** .08** .02 .11** -.09** .05**
Note: Valid N: 4665.
          **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
          *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
          The full names of the abbreviations can be seen in 3.2.
Table 2. Regression results of EPPST on ROEt+1
Model B
Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficients
t Sig.
Std. Error Beta
Model 1
(Constant) -.156 .026 -5.923 .000
EPPST .001 .001 .030 2.059 .040
SIZE .008 .001 .120 6.632 .000
DEBT -.020 .007 -.045 -2.769 .006
BAORD -.001 .001 -.024 -1.475 .140
RID -.069 .025 -.043 -2.750 .006
DUAL .005 .004 .019 1.246 .213
RFE .024 .008 .045 2.976 .003
AGE .000 .000 .031 1.990 .047
TENU .000 .000 -.046 -2.955 .003
RFS .121 .012 .205 9.733 .000
BDS .033 .004 .194 9.476 .000
RMS .460 .100 .070 4.587 .000
EAST .004 .003 .022 1.432 .152
R 0.246 R2 0.060 Adjusted R2 0.058
F 21.531 Model Sig. 0.000 N 4365
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P=0.000), which means H1 still holds.
Referring to the method of Takao & Kubo[26] and 
Kampkötter[27], the employees’ PPS is calculated as the 
ratio of the change rate of employees’ total compensation 
to the change rate of firm performance (EPS). To be spe-
cific, the employees’ PPS (EPPSR) can be expressed by 
"[(TRECt-TRECt-1) / TRECt-1] / [(EPSt-EPSt-1) / EPSt-1]”. 
To replace EPPST with EPPSR in Model 1, Model 
1** is constructed. Regression results of Model 1** are 
shown in Table 4. According to Table 4, the coefficient of 
EPPSR on ROEt+1 is still significantly positive (β=0.026, 
P=0.063). Hence, all the three measurement methods ad-
opted in this study confirm H1.
b. Robustness test on H1 based the measurement 
of the future firm performance
To replace ROEt+1 with ROAt+1 in Model 1, Model 1*** 
is constructed. Regression results of Model 1*** with the 
whole sample are shown in Table 5. According to Table 
5, the coefficient of EPPST on ROAt+1 is still significant-
ly positive (β=0.031, P=0.024). H1still holds when the 
measurement of future firm performance is changed into 
Table 3. Regression results of EPPS01 on ROEt+1
Model B
Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficients
t Sig.
Std. Error Beta
Model 1*
(Constant) -.160 .026 -6.090 .000
EPPS01 .012 .002 .075 5.139 .000
SIZE .008 .001 .119 6.604 .000
DEBT -.019 .007 -.044 -2.722 .007
BAORD -.001 .001 -.025 -1.530 .126
RID -.069 .025 -.043 -2.769 .006
DUAL .005 .004 .019 1.250 .211
RFE .025 .008 .045 3.012 .003
AGE .000 .000 .030 1.922 .055
TENU .000 .000 -.046 -2.944 .003
RFS .120 .012 .204 9.685 .000
BDS .033 .003 .192 9.423 .000
RMS .470 .100 .071 4.693 .000
EAST .004 .003 .023 1.491 .136
R 0.255 R2 0.065 Adjusted R2 0.062
F 23.345 Model Sig 0.000 N 4365
Table 4. Regression results of EPPSR on ROEt+1
Model B
Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficients
t Sig.
Std. Error Beta
Model 1**
(Constant) -.036 .012 -2.987 .003
EPPSR .001 .000 .026 1.856 .063
SIZE .004 .001 .109 6.349 .000
DEBT -.073 .003 -.347 -22.343 .000
BAORD .000 .000 -.007 -.442 .658
RID -.041 .011 -.053 -3.549 .000
DUAL .003 .002 .022 1.501 .133
RFE .007 .004 .028 1.986 .047
AGE .000 .000 .049 3.307 .001
TENU -4.293E-5 .000 -.036 -2.412 .016
RFS .050 .006 .178 8.888 .000
BDS .014 .002 .164 8.445 .000
RMS .204 .046 .064 4.444 .000
EAST .002 .001 .022 1.507 .132
R 0.391 R2 0.153 Adjusted R2 0.15
F 60.274 Model Sig 0.000 N 4365
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ROAt+1.
To replace ROEt+1 with EPSt+1 in Model 1, Model 
1**** is constructed. Regression results of Model 1**** 
are shown in Table 6. According to Table 6, the coefficient 
of EPPST on EPSt+1 is still significantly positive (β=0.025, 
P=0.070). H1still holds when the measurement of future 
firm performance is changed into EPSt+1.
4.4 Test on H2
Regression results of Model 2 are shown in Table 7. Ac-
cording to Table 7, the coefficient of TMPPS on EPSt+1 is 
significantly positive (β=0.073, P=0.000). To compare the 
results of the coefficient of TMPPS in Table 7 and the co-
efficient of EPPST in Table 6, it can be known H2 holds.
It is worth mentioning that when we respectively input 
all the dummy variables of years and industries into Mod-
el 1, Model 1*, Model 1**, Model 1***, Model 1**** 
and Model 2, all the links between the employees’ PPS 
and the future firm performance would not change. In ad-
dition, the results of Model 1**** and Model 2 would get 
even more significant. Due to the paper length limitation, 
the detailed tables on such regression results are omitted.
Table 5. Regression results of EPPST on ROAt+1
Model
B
Unstandardized coefficients
Standardized coeffi-
cients t Sig.
Std. Error Beta
Model 1***
(Constant) -.036 .012 -2.978 .003
EPPST .001 .000 .031 2.251 .024
SIZE .004 .001 .109 6.329 .000
DEBT -.073 .003 -.346 -22.319 .000
BAORD .000 .000 -.007 -.429 .668
RID -.040 .011 -.052 -3.527 .000
DUAL .003 .002 .022 1.529 .126
RFE .007 .004 .028 1.985 .047
AGE .000 .000 .049 3.311 .001
TENU -4.322E-5 .000 -.036 -2.429 .015
RFS .050 .006 .178 8.903 .000
BDS .014 .002 .164 8.445 .000
RMS .204 .046 .064 4.458 .000
EAST .002 .001 .022 1.499 .134
R 0.391 R2 .153 Adjusted R2 .150
F 60.420 Model Sig 0.000 N 4365
Table 6. Regression results of EPPST on EPSt+1
Model B
Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficients
t Sig.
Std. Error Beta
Model 1****
(Constant) -1.861 .111 -16.791 .000
EPPST .005 .003 .025 1.814 .070
SIZE .104 .005 .342 19.797 .000
DEBT -.352 .030 -.183 -11.708 .000
BAORD -.011 .003 -.055 -3.528 .000
RID -.537 .105 -.076 -5.092 .000
DUAL .049 .018 .039 2.735 .006
RFE .081 .034 .034 2.342 .019
AGE .002 .001 .035 2.356 .018
TENU .000 .000 -.033 -2.214 .027
RFS .407 .052 .157 7.783 .000
BDS .131 .015 .174 8.904 .000
RMS 2.061 .422 .071 4.880 .000
EAST -.020 .011 -.027 -1.818 .069
R 0.379 R2 0.144 Adjusted R2 0.141
F 56.217 Model Sig. 0.000 N 4365
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5. Discussion
5.1 General Findings
Facing the research gap in exploring the link between the 
employees’ PPS and the future firm performance under 
Chinese context, a well-designed balanced pane data con-
sisting of 4365 firm-year observations of Chinese listed 
state-owned enterprises over 2007-2015 is employed, and 
the multiple regression analysis based on OLS is adopted 
with SPSS23 to investigate how the incentive effect and 
risk-aversion effect of the employees’ PPS would affect 
the future firm performance. Empirical results manifest 
that the employees’ PPS can enhance the future firm per-
formance, which is consistent with our hypothesis. In this 
logic, the four potential paths of higher employees’ PPS 
to improve the future firm performance should be correct. 
However, the standardized coefficients of the employees’ 
PPS on the future firm performance in Model1 to Model6 
are rather low, which mean that in practice the incentive 
effect of the employees’ PPS is rather weak. And such a 
weak incentive effect doesn’t reach the expectations of the 
researchers and policy-makers.
The potential reasons for this fact, except for the possi-
ble risk-aversion effect of the higher employees’ PPS men-
tioned at the beginning of the paper, may rely on the nature 
of the state-owned enterprises heavily. To be specific, most 
of the state-owned enterprises in China operate in natural 
monopoly industries or policy monopoly industries, where 
firm performance is essentially determined by their monop-
oly situation and top managers’ strategic planning to a larg-
er part, while leaving less performance improvement room 
for the employees to strive for. In this case, the incentive 
effect of higher employees’ PPS would be rather weak for 
most of the rank and file staff, except for the limited core 
employees who have strong confidence in improving firm 
performance and realizing their self-worth.
Besides, compared with the incentive effect of the top 
managers’ PPS, the incentive effect of the employees’ PPS 
is relatively weaker. The possible two reasons can poten-
tially explain such a result. One is that, compared with the 
employees, the top managers have much stronger capability 
and influence in determining the future firm performance, 
which confirms to the basic assumption of the Upper Ech-
elons theory. On the other hand, the top managers are more 
willing to take higher performance risks than the rank and 
file staff, because they generally have a stronger sense of 
responsibility and a higher capability of accountability.
5.2 Theoretical Contributions
There are three theoretical contributions derived from 
the results. First, we confirm and clarify the positive per-
formance consequences of the employees' PPS for the 
first time, which enriches the theoretical framework of 
compensation incentive mechanisms by extending the ap-
plication levels of PPS to the front-line employees. The-
oretical analysis confirms that a higher employees’ PPS 
would be beneficial to the future firm performance for the 
Chinese listed state-owned enterprises. In other words, the 
incentive effect of the employees’ PPS dominates over the 
risk-aversion effect.
Second, we are the first to compare the incentive effect 
on firm performance between the employees' PPS and 
Table 7. Regression results of TMPPS on EPSt+1
Model B
Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficients
t Sig.
Std. Error Beta
Model 2
(Constant) -.163 .026 -6.181 .000
TMPPS .012 .002 .073 4.969 .000
SIZE .008 .001 .120 6.642 .000
DEBT -.020 .007 -.046 -2.813 .005
BAORD -.001 .001 -.025 -1.523 .128
RID -.067 .025 -.042 -2.694 .007
DUAL .005 .004 .018 1.183 .237
RFE .025 .008 .046 3.051 .002
AGE .000 .000 .030 1.954 .051
TENU .000 .000 -.044 -2.813 .005
RFS .121 .012 .204 9.728 .000
BDS .033 .003 .193 9.450 .000
RMS .458 .100 .069 4.574 .000
EAST .004 .003 .021 1.399 .162
R 0.255 R2 0.065 Adjusted R2 0.062
F 23.204 Model Sig 0.000 N 4365
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the top managers' PPS. Empirical results suggest that the 
positive effect of the employees’ PPS on the future firm 
performance does not reach the theoretical expectations, 
and it is weaker than the positive effect of the top man-
agers’ PPS on the future firm performance. However, the 
dark side of the so-called incentive effect cannot be ig-
nored. A more recent study by Yu-Ju Chen et al.[28] argued 
that managers and employees with too high PPS, which 
means higher incentive effect, will engage to making 
risky decisions which may harm firms' value in the future. 
Therefore, it seems that compensation committee should 
redesign managers' compensation contract for limiting 
their risk-taking behavior.
Third, we add new knowledge in understanding the 
trade-off mechanisms between the incentive effect and 
risk-aversion effect of the employees' PPS in the context 
of the listed state-owned enterprises in China. According 
to Horovitz and Thietart [29], who argued that the validity 
of internal performance management system is the key to 
align the objectives of the employees facing higher incen-
tive compensation with the improvement of firm perfor-
mance, the new knowledge found in this paper indicates 
that on the one hand, the employees in Chinese listed 
state-owned enterprises hold positive attitudes towards 
risk, and on the other hand, the validity and correctness of 
the performance management system in such enterprises 
are getting better and better.
5.3 Practical Implications
Based on the conclusions, the following suggestions can 
be proposed. (1) To improve the employees’ PPS to a 
greater degree, since at present higher PPS would improve 
the future firm performance; (2) To improve the diversity 
of employees’ rewards by providing them with more de-
layed salary, long-term salary or equity salary, since cash 
compensation itself cannot effectively align the long-term 
interests objects between the employees and the firm; (3) 
To perfect the performance management system inside 
the state-owned enterprises, since unreasonable perfor-
mance evaluation would do harm to the incentive effect of 
the higher employees’ PPS; (4) To endow the employees 
with higher job discretion and promote the participatory 
management, which can satisfy the employees’ senses of 
achievements and self-worth, and further improve their 
engagement in their jobs and stimulate them to execute 
more innovative workplace behavior.
5.4 Limitations and Directions for Future Re-
search
Future research should further explore the following 
topics: First, the paper only focuses on the state-owned 
enterprises, while leaving the non-state-owned enterprises 
unexplored. The future studies should expand the samples 
into more types of enterprises, and attempts to describe 
and compare the effects of the employees’ PPS on future 
firm performance between the state-owned enterprises and 
the other enterprises, or between the manufacturing en-
terprises and the non-manufacturing enterprises. Second, 
the paper takes the all the employees as a whole, however, 
different types of employees would have various attitudes 
towards a higher PPS. Hence, the future studies can cat-
egorize employees into multiple types, and compare the 
effects of PPS on future firm performance among different 
types of employees, e.g., sales staff VS production staff, 
or core staff VS general staff.
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